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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Can title based upon a tax deed, coupled with actual

possession, be collaterally attacked after 70 years as having failed to
convey the underlying real property in abrogation of the statute of
limitations?
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals fail

to follow

the

pronouncement of this Court in Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714
P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986) by refusing to rule that the Plaintiffs had
title to the real property by adverse possession since they were in
possession and no one other than themselves or their predecessors
paid taxes on the property between 1910 and 1931?
3. Can title to a home and real estate based upon actual
possession

and a Quit-Claim Deed be attacked after

70 years,

contrary to the Utah Marketable Title Act § 57-9-1 et seq?
4.

In the event Appellants did not have title by adverse

possession, does the continuous use of the home located on the
property since at least 1910 support a prescriptive easement for the
continued use and maintenance of that home in the defined yard?
5.

The Utah Court of Appeals failed to address Appellants'

claim for damages caused by the Defendants1 destruction of their
home to build a highway.

REFERENCE TO THE REPORT OF THE OPINION
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals (Case No. 880131-CA) is
reproduced as Exhibit No. 1 in the Appendix to this Petition for Writ
of Certiorari.
1

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH IS INVOKED
Jurisdiction for this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals is found in Title 78, Chapter 2, Section 2 of the Utah
Code; and Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 4 of the Utah Code (amended
1986) and in Title 6 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a quiet title case filed by the Plaintiffs against Park City,
a municipal corporation and the State of Utah for possession and title
to the Plaintiffs family home in Park City which they and their
family occupied since 1910.

Plaintiffs also claim damages in the

amount of $20,000.00 against Park City for their destruction of the
home on the property.
Park City requested the Plaintiffs to repair their home which
they were in the process of doing when Park City issued a demolition
permit to a third party for the destruction of the home.
damages was timely submitted to Park City.

A claim for

After the house was

removed, Park City conveyed the property to the State of Utah for
construction of a new highway to Deer Valley in 1982.
Park City claims they have no liability for the destruction of
the Plaintiffs' home because it was done by a third party and the
State of Utah claims that while their record of title to the property is
flawed, it is superior to that of the Plaintiffs.
A trial was held before the Court on May 6, 1987 and Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment were entered dismissing
2

Plaintiffs1 Complaint and quieting title to the real property in the
State of Utah.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and the case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals.

The Utah Court of Appeals, in an

Opinion filed March 13, 1989 held that: the State of Utah's title, while
flawed, was superior to that of the Appellant; the tax deeds issued by
Summit County in 1914, 1917, 1957 and 1963 did not convey any
real property, but only improvements; Defendants were not barred
from challenging Plaintiffs1 title by the statute of limitation; and,
Plaintiffs did not have a prescriptive easement to maintain their
house and yard if their title failed.
The Court of Appeals did not address Plaintiffs' claim for
damages against Park City as a result of Park City's destruction of the
home located on the property in question, or the application of the
Utah Marketable Title Act, §§ 57-9-1 et seq. U.C.A.

ARGUMENT
I.
The Statute of Limitations in Section 78-12-5.1
Utah Code Annotated Bars A Collateral Attack
On A "Tax Title" After Four Years
Plaintiffs' heirs commenced living in this home in about 1910.
In addition to continuously occupying the home since that time, the
Plaintiffs and their heirs occupied the fenced yard adjacent to the
property in conjunction with their home.

The Plaintiffs' grandfather,

William Rolfe, lived on the property until his death in 1939.

Their

grandmother, his wife, continued to occupy the property until 1946.
3

William Rolfe's son, Charles, rented out the house from 1949 until
1964.

He died in 1966 and his wife followed in 1981.

Charles'

daughters have regularly visited the property at least yearly since
that time (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.2).

"There was no evidence

that anyone other than William Rolfe paid taxes on the property until
1931" (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.3).
The documents supporting Plaintiffs' title by tax deed start
with a quit-claim deed from McPollin to McCarrell dated March 19,
1906 (Appendix, Exhibit 2).

Neither of these parties were ever

related to the Plaintiffs.
On June 10, 1914, a tax deed was issued to William Rolfe for
"improvements east U.C. track, Park City, Utah" (Appendix, Exhibit 3).
That deed also states, "this deed is made from title secured from a
certain tax sale in the year 1909 and by an auditor's deed to Summit
County, dated May 14, 1914 and in accordance with Section 2655,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907." Section 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah,
1907, provides for a tax deed for the sale of real estate sold for tax
delinquencies.

It does not allow a deed or sale of personal property.

In fact, this Section prohibits a sale "in a cases where the description
of such real estate is so defective as to convey no title . . ."
Apparently,

in 1914, the description was sufficient in the minds of

the County government to describe what real estate was being sold
since they were statutorily prohibited from the sale if it could not be
identified.
In the event the 1914 deed was not valid, then this property
would have remained in the name of McCarrell, being the grantee of
the 1906 Deed from McPollin; or in the name of one of the
4

Defendants' predecessors - Park City Smelting Company (Court of
Appeals Opinion, p.3, ^2).

One of these parties would have been

legally responsible for paying the taxes.
Laws of Utah, 1907.

Section 2425, Compiled

A second tax deed was executed to William

Rolfe from Summit County on June 21, 1917 (Appendix, Exhibit 4).
Another tax deed was also referenced in a letter from the Summit
County Treasurer to Charles Rolfe for this property (Appendix,
Exhibit 5).

In 1963 a subsequent tax deed was issued to Plaintiffs'

father, Charles Rolfe, who was a completely different person than
William Rolfe and also an heir of the Plaintiffs' (Appendix, Exhibit 6).
Letters from Summit County also confirmed that Plaintiffs had paid
taxes from 1940 - 1957 and 1972 (Appendix, Exhibits 5 and 7).
The Court of Appeals misinterpreted this Court's decision in
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah, 1982) by holding that "one
who has a tax deed but does not hold title to the property cannot
assert" (Statute of Limitations, § 78-12-5.1).

This holding is, in fact,

contrary to the holding by this Court in Dillman, supra. The scope of
that ruling determines that a person with legal title who is otherwise
responsible for the taxes, cannot buttress his titles by allowing taxes
to lapse and thereafter performing his legal duties by paying them.
Both the trial court and appeals court found, the "vested title"
lay in the respondent's predecessors (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.3).
Section 80-5-12 U.C.A. (1943) is almost identical to the earlier
statute found in Section 2524, Compiled Laws of Utah (1907) and
provides the person chargeable with paying taxes:
"If the name of the owner or claimant of any
property is known to the assessor, or if it
5

appears of record in the office of the County
Recorder where the property is situated, the
property must be assessed to such name . . ."
If the Plaintiffs' predecessors did not hold title as a result of
the 1907 deed, then, in 1917, the property was in the name of either
McCarrell or Park City Smelting Company who were legally obligated
to pay the taxes on their property.
such payments and Plaintiffs1

They unequivocally made no

tax deeds are insulated from a

collateral attack after all these years as provided for in Section 7812-5.1 U.C.A. (1953, as amended) which provides in part,
"With respect to action or defenses brought or
interposed for the recovery or possession of,
or to quiet title or determine the ownership of
real property against the holder of a tax title
to such property, no such action or defense
shall be commenced or interposed more than
four years after the date of the tax deed,
conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title
unless the person commencing or interposing
such action or defense, or his predecessor, has
actually occupied or been in possession of
such property within four years . . . "

In Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah, 1982), this Court,
relying on Frederiksen v. La Fleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah, 1981) stated
"That policy of protection is based on the
assumption that the tax debtor is the
possessor of property which is probably his
home or farm land."
This property was the Rolfe

family

home for 70 years and

Respondents1 claims are barred by the four year statute of limitation
arising out of any one of the four tax deeds (Addendum, Exhibits 2-4

6

and 7) coupled with the Plaintiffs1 continuous possession.

Section 78-

12-5.3 provides that the "tax title" is any title received by way of a
sale for delinquency taxes and it is irrelevant if the title "is valid or
not."

"Real Estate" includes "the possession of, claim to, ownership of,

or right to the possession of, land . . . "

§ 80-3-1(2) U.C.A. (1943).

II.
Title Vested In Plaintiff In 1917 By
Adverse Possession And Cannot Be
Challenged 70 Years Later
Plaintiffs submit that this Court's decision in Park West Village
v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986) is "on all fours" with this action
and requires review of the Court of Appeals' decision which is in
direct conflict with that ruling.
Ignoring, for a moment, all evidence or occurrences after 1931,
it is uncontested that there was "no evidence that anyone other than
William Rolfe paid taxes on the property until 1931"

(Utah Court of

Appeals Opinion, p.3). He started living in the house in 1910 and
resided there continuously
Opinion, p.2).

until after

1931 (Court of

Appeals

The record title holder, according to the Respondents

and the Court of Appeals was Lewis Withey and Clay Holister (Court
of Appeals Opinion, p.3, M|3,4,5).
If any taxes were assessed on the realty then they were paid
by William Rolfe.

If, as the Court of Appeals states, the taxes were

assessed on the improvements only, then Plaintiffs are relieved of
their obligation to pay non-existent assessments, Park West Village
v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah, 1986), Royal Street Land Co. v. Reed,
739 P2d. 1104 (Utah, 1987).
7

It should be noted that this property is right next door to the
Avise

property and the adjoining fence constitutes part of the

definition of the yard in that case.

The uncertain deeds and

procedures followed by Summit County in early portions of this
century are the same in that case as they are here.

Once title vests

after seven years it cannot be attacked half a century later, § 78-127 U.C.A. (1953).
III.
Plaintiffs' "Root Of Title" Is More Than 40
Years Old And Insulated From Challenge By The
Utah Marketable Title Act, §§ 57-9-1, et. seq.
William Rolfe obtained a deed to this real estate from Summit
County in June, 1917 (Appendix, Exhibit 4).

William Rolfe and his

family or their tenants continually occupied the home and property
until 1964 and regularly visited to the day the house was destroyed
(Court of Appeals Opinion, p.2).

This deed vested color of title in

William Rolfe, Baker v. Goodwin, 57 Utah 379, 194 P.2d 117 (1920).
Respondents had actual notice of the Plaintiffs1 claim of
ownership by the recorded deed and the Rolfe families' continuous
possession, Falcenaro Enterprises v. Valley Investment Company, 16
Utah 2d 77, 395 P.2d 915 (1974).
Section 57-9-1 U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1963) states that
Plaintiffs have marketable title and acts to cut off Defendants' claims
because the "root of title" from which the Respondents1 claim
ownership is more than 40 years old.

This fact considered in

conjunction with the fact that none of the Defendants nor their
predecessors were ever in possession of this property, while the
8

Plaintiffs have been in continuous possession, falls squarely within
the protection of the Marketable Title Act, § 57-9-1 et seq. and
insulates Plaintiffs' title from the Respondents1 challenge.

IV.
If Plaintiffs Did Not Have Title,. They
Had A Prescriptive Right To Maintain
Their House And Yard
Plaintiffs continuously used and lived at this property for over
70 years, to the exclusion of the world.

Some comment is made that

Mr. Rolfe was given permission to build the house by Silver King
Coalition Mine.

This was impossible since this Company did not even

claim an interest until 1926 (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.3), and Mr.
Rolfe and his wife had already been there for at least 16 years.
Plaintiffs further stated that no one in their family had ever worked
for this Company or any company related to it.
If

seventy

years

of

open,

notorious,

and

unchallenged

possession, is not sufficient to vest title in Plaintiffs, it ripened into
prescriptive use for the maintenance of the yard and house on this
property, Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714 (1946).
V.
Park City Is Liable For Damages For
Destroying Plaintiffs1 Home
In August, 1981, Park City had Deer Valley Resort bulldoze
Plaintiffs' home so that the new road to Deer Valley could be built
across this lot (Appendix, Exhibit 8).

Neither the State of Utah nor

Park City claimed Deer Valley Resort ever owned any interest in this
property.

Plaintiffs submitted a timely claim to Park City for the
9

damage which was denied.

Thereafter an action in the District Court

was filed within the time limit prescribed by State law.
The trial court confused the exhibits and held that notice was
not timely filed and that Park City was not responsible because the
building was destroyed by a third party pursuant to the City's
demolition permit.

The trial court found a claim was filed on

September 20, 1982, but that was the dat the claim was denied.

The

clam (Exhibit 18 in the trial court) was submitted August 30, 1982,
within the time provided by law. § 63-30-13 U.C.A. (1953).

The trial

court confused the dates and the Court of Appeals did not address
this issue.
building

There is unrefutted

was worth

testimony to the Court that the

at least $20,000.00 (Appendix, Exhibit

Testimony of Merle Anderson)

9,

Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Ut.

App. 1987).
The Court of Appeals failed to consider this issue and if
Plaintiffs1 claim and cause of action were timely under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, then Plaintiffs are entitled to damages
against Park City for having a third party destroy the home to build
a public road without condemnation proceedings being filed.
demolition permit also included the Avise

The

house which was not

destroyed because Mr. Avise was there.

CONCLUSION
The Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has misconstrued

Utah

law

governing statutes of limitations intended to protect title to persons1
homes and real estate after those persons have lived in and paid
taxes on the property for years.
10

Conflicting standards as to when

and on what basis people may rely on their ownership now exist and
must be resolved.

The Court of Appeals1 decision requiers review in

accordance with Rule 43(1), (2), (3) and (4).
In addition, there is another action pending before this Court
which may impact this decision.
Kimball,

In Sweeney

Company

v.

Supreme Court No. 880485, this Court granted a Petition for

Writ of Certiorari dated March 23, 1989.
action

Land

involves

the evidence

necessary

One of the issues in that
to establish

rights

by

prescription as well as what constitutes "consent" to the historical use
of property.

The decision in the Sweeney

Land

Company,

supra

matter may necessitate review of the Court of Appeals decision in
this action.
The Court should issue its Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals that it direct the trial court to quiet title to the subject
property in the name of the Plaintiffs

and award judgment for

damages for the destruction of Plaintiffs1 home in the amount of
$20,000.00.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^Zday of April, 1989.

Robert Felton
Attorney for Petitioners

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copy of
the Defendants-Respondents1 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI by
11

United States first-class mail, postage prepaid, to James W. Carter,
Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 1480, Park City, Utah 84060 and Alan
Bachman, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84144 on the y^-day of April, 1989
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO-

Velma Marchant, Elma
Winterton, Leora Robinson,
Wanda Penrod, Mona Lichty,
Merle Anderson,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

•-

• •

* - r-%

FILED

Cterke/tt* Court
Utth Court ot Appeals

OPINION

(For Publication)

v.
Park City, a municipal
corporation, and the State
of Utah,

Case No. 880131-CA

Defendants and Respondents.

Third District, Summit County
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon
Attorneys:

Robert Felton, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
J. Craig Smith, James W. Carter, Park City,
for Park City
Alan Bachman, Salt Lake City, for the State
of Utah

Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Orrae.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellants challenge the trial court's ruling that they
did not have vested title to certain real property in Park City
and thus were not entitled to recover damages for destruction
of the home on the property* Appellants claim that they have
title to the property through adverse possession, deeds or
alternatively, that their use was prescriptive. Accordingly,
they claim entitlement to $20,000 in damages for the
destruction of the residence on the property. We affirm.

pypffp?- *

In August of 1981, Park City issued a demolition permit
to Deer Valley Resort to remove a building. The building was
demolished by Lloyd Brothers Construction Company between
August 4 and September 7 of 1981 allegedly to build an access
road Deer Valley Resort. Appellants brought this action
seeking to quiet title to the real property and to recover
damages for the destruction of the home located on the property.
According to appellants, their grandfather, William
Rolfe, possessed the home and yard on the property from 1910
until his death in 1939. After his death, his wife continued
to occupy the property until 1946. She died in about 1949.
William Rolfe1s son, Charles Rolfe, rented out the house from
1949 until about 1964. Charles Rolfe died in 1966 and his
wife, Ethel Rolfe, died in 1981. Charles Rolfefs daughters,
appellants, claim to have visited the property at least once a
year since 1964. In support of their claim that they have
vested title to the property, appellants rely on the following
documents:
1. A quit claim deed from Dan and Belle McPolin to Jesse
McCarrell dated March 19, 1906 for ••that certain one-story
framed, three-room dwelling house situated on the easterly side
of Silver Creek and about 100 feet easterly from the lumberyard
of the Summit Lumber Company.*
2. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William Rolph
[sic] dated June 10, 1914 for $28.68 for "[improvements East
U.C. Tracks, Park City, Utah." The quit claim deed states that
the deed is -made from title secured from a tax sale in the
year 1909 and by an Auditors deed to Summit bounty, dated May
1st, 1914."
3. A quit claim deed from Summit County to William Rolfe
dated June 21, 1917 for $1.00 for "that certain frame dwelling
house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Summit County, Utah,
assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912."
4. A letter from the Summit County Treasurer to Charles
Rolfe dated May 16, 1957 stating that in 1938 the county issued
a quit claim deed to Charles Rolfefs father. The letter also
stated that from 1940 to 1954, taxes were taken care of by
widows abatement and that Charles Rolfe paid taxes of $8.06 in
1955 and $7.33 in 1956.
5. A tax deed from Summit County to Charles Rolfe dated
June 13, 1963 for "House in lumber yard," stating M[t]his
conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee
of the sum of $12.53 delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and

880131-CA

2

costs, constituting a charge against said real estate for the
year 1958 in the sum of $7.81."
The State of Utah claims chain of title through a series
of documents, all of which were recorded, and all, except
numbers 3, 4 and 5 below, contained a metes and bounds
description of the property. The documents are as follows:
1. A patent from the United States government,
undisputedly containing the property in question, to George
Snyder on April 5, 1882.
2. A deed from George Snyder to the Park City Smelting
Company, dated November 14, 1883.
3. A deed from the Park City Smelting Company to Lewis
H. Withey and Clay H. Hollister on September 21, 1912. The
deed did not contain a metes and bounds description, but
described the conveyed property as "all of the real property or
rights or interest in real property belonging to the Park City
Smelting Company and situated in the County of Summit, Utah,"
4. A deed from the executors of Lewis H. Withey's estate
to Silver King Coalition Mines Company on November 5, 1926.
The deed did not have a metes and bounds description, but
conveyed "all the estate, right, title, interest, property,
claim and demand whatsoever of the said Lewis H. Withey • • •
[of] the property above described."
5. A trustee's deed from Clay Hollister, Withey1s tenant
in common, to Silver King Coalition Mines on February 18,
1927. The deed did not contain a metes and bounds description
but described the property as "all other real property or
rights or interests in real property . . . belonging to Park
City Smelting Company, and situated in the County of Summit,
State of Utah."
6. A deed from Silver King Coalition Mines Company to
United Park City Mines Company, dated May 8, 1953.
7. A deed from United Park City Mines Company to Park
City, dated April 2, 1969.
8. A deed from Park City to the State of Utah, dated
June 7, 1982.
£here was no evidence that anyone other than ^William
JEolfe paid taxes on the property until 1931. From 1931 to
1953, the real property in question was assessed as part of
Silver King Coalition Mines Company. From 1954 to 1969, real
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property taxes were assessed to and paid by United Park City
Mines.
The trial court found that appellants* chain of title was
discontinuous and, at best/ conveyed title to improvements on
the property only. The court concluded that the Statefs claim
to title of the property was superior to that of appellants
and, therefore, quieted title in the State of Utah and
dismissed appellants1 complaint.
On appeal, appellants assert that: 1) the trial court
erred in finding that they did not have vested title to the
property by deed or adverse possession; 2) even if appellants
do not have title to the property, they established
prescriptive use; 3) respondents are barred from challenging
appellants1 tax title by the statute of limitations set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987); and 4) respondents'
claims are barred by laches and estoppel.
Vested Title
Appellants first claim on appeal that the trial court
erred in concluding they did not have vested title to the
property by deed. Appellants assert they obtained tax title to
the property by virtue of the 1914 quit claim deed and the 1963
tax deed from Summit County, and any action challenging that
title is barred by the four year statute of limitations set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 .(1987). In addition, they
claim title under the Marketable Record Title Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 57-9-1 through -10 (1986), commencing with the 1917 quit
claim deed as the ••root* of title. The trial court concluded
that the tax deeds under which appellants claimed title did not
convey title to the underlying real property.
In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, we
apply a correction of error standard with no deference to the
trial court. Creer v. Vallev Bank and Trust Co.. 97 Utah Adv.
Rep. 12, 12 (Dec. 9, 1988). A person who has a duty to pay
taxes cannot fail to pay taxes and subsequently purchase the
land at a tax sale and thereby attempt to strengthen his title
to the property. Dillman v. Foster. 656 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah
1982); Crofts v. Johnson. 6 Utah 2d 350, 313 P.2d 808, 810
(1957). In addition, one who has a tax deed but does not hold
title to the property cannot assert the special statute of
limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5.1 (1987).
Dillman. 656 P.2d at 978-79.
In this case, there is no indication that William Rolfe
was the record titleholder. Even assuming he received quit
claim deeds from Summit County in 1914, 1917 and 1957 after
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paying delinquent taxes, we agree with the trial court that, at
most, he received title to the improvements described in the
deeds. The 1963 tax deed, similarly, conveyed only the
improvements, not the underlying real property. Taxes at that
time were apparently separately assessed on improvements and
real property in Summit County, and the Statefs predecessor in
title, United Park City Mines, paid real property taxes from
1954 to 1969. The deeds did not strengthen Rolfe's title to
the property, but merely indicated that he paid delinquent
taxes on the property. The State's title, on the other hand,
tthile flawed, is clearly superior to that of appellants.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in
concluding that appellants failed to establish title to the
property by deed and that the tax deed statute of limitations
was inapplicable.
Adverse Possession
Appellants' second assertion of error is that the trial
court erred in finding that appellants did not have title to
the property by adverse possession. The proponent of an
adverse possession claim has the burden of proving full
statutory compliance, including the payment of all taxes levied
and assessed. Neelev v. Kelsch. 600 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah
1979). However, if a party in possession of property and his
predecessors have paid taxes based on the value of improvements
on the property and no taxes have been levied based on the
valuation of the land, the party has established title to the
property by adverse possession if all other elements of adverse
possession are met. Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d
1137, 1140-41 (Utah 1986); s&s. zlssi Royal Street Lgnfl Co. vt
Reed. 739 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Utah 1987).
In Avise, the trial court found that Mrs. Lake failed to
acquire title to property because she failed to pay taxes on
the property. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, stating that
the trial court9s finding that Mrs. Lake failed to pay taxes on
the property was contrary to the evidence. The court noted
that an employee of the Summit County assessor's office
testified at trial that he had searched the records in that
office and could find no evidence that any taxes had been
assessed on the land prior to 1975. The undisputed evidence
established that Mrs. Lake received a tax notice every year and
paid the tax that was levied. Although those taxes were based
only on the value of the improvements on the property, the Utah
Supreme Court held that because no other taxes were levied,
Mrs. Lake had -paid all taxes levied and assessed" in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-12 (1977). The court
also noted that there was no evidence that there were any
delinquent taxes owing on the land for the years prior to 1975
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or that the land had been sold by the County for failure to pay
taxes for those years.
Appellants claim that this case is indistinguishable from
Avise. We disagree. In Avise, unlike this case, Mrs. Lake
established that she had paid taxes on the improvements to the
property for twenty-three years. In this case, however, the
only evidence that appellants' predecessors had paid taxes on
the property for seven continuous years were quit claim and tax
deeds and a letter from Reed Pace to Charles Rolfe. There was
no evidence that taxes were paid prior to delinquency. At
best, the deeds and letter indicate that William Rolfe paid
delinquent taxes on the personal property at various tax
sales. Further, appellants established that Charles Rolfe paid
taxes on improvements on the property in 1955, 1956 and 1958,
but it was also proven that real property taxes were paid by
Silver King Coalition Mines Company those same years. Thus,
unlike Avise, appellants failed to prove that they paid taxes
on the home or on the underlying land for a continuous seven
year period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7.1 (1987). Payment
of delinquent taxes at a tax sale cannot be used to establish
the payment of taxes necessary to a successful claim of adverse
possession. Otherwise, anyone purchasing property at a tax
sale would be able to claim the number of years taxes had gone
unpaid as a credit on the seven year period required for
adverse possession. In addition, in contrast to Avise, the
quit claim deeds themselves establish that taxes were assessed
and not paid during the years appellants claim to have
established title by adverse possession. Therefore, we hold
that appellants failed to sustain their burden of proving
payment of taxes for the requisite seven year period, and the
trial court correctly concluded that appellants did not acquire
the property by adverse possession*
Prescriptive Easement
Appellants also assert that even if they do not have fee
title to the property by adverse possession or chain of title,
they have a prescriptive easement. Appellants are unclear as
to what they claim flows from the alleged prescriptive
easement. If they claim that a prescriptive easement, if
established, would give them ownership rights in the underlying
property, they err. £g£ Osborn & Cavwood Ditch Co. v. Green.
673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983). A prescriptive
easement does not result in ownership, but allows only use of
property belonging to another for a limited purpose. North
Union Canal Co. v. Newell. 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah 1976). A
prescriptive easement "arises under our common law from a use
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of the servient estate that is fopen# notorious, adverse, and
continuous for a period of 20 years.f" Crane v. Crane, 683
P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) (quoting Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d
150, 152 (Utah 1981)). The trial court concluded that
appellants had not established a prescriptive easement.1 A
claimant of prescriptive easement must establish the necessary
elements by clear and convincing evidence. Garmond v. Kinney.
91 N.M. 646, 579 P.2d 178, 178 (1978). Appellants not only had
the burden of proof at trial, but on appeal are similarly
required to marshall all evidence supporting the trial court's
findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence, when viewed
most favorably to the trial court, is insufficient. Scharf v.
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Appellants have
not marshalled the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings in connection with the issue of prescriptive
easement. It further follows that on appeal, appellants are
required to marshall evidence which would support each element
required to prove their claim of prescriptive easement. For
example, the trial court found that appellants' predecessors in
interest worked for Silver King Coalition Mines Company, and
were given permission by the company to build a house on the
property in question. Appellants claim that this finding is
not supported by the evidence but they do not provide,-other
argument or reference to the trial record to establish that the
use was "adverse," one of the required elements for
prescriptive easement. Similarly, appellants have not compiled
evidence which establishes the other necessary elements and
have further failed to analyze what rights or claims to damages
might flow from the alleged prescriptive easement. We will not
consider conclusory arguments without citation to either the
record or cases involving pivotal issues. Randall v. Salvation
Armv, 100 Nev. 466, 686 P.2d 241, 244 (1984). Therefore, we
find that appellants did not establish a prescriptive easement
to the property.
Laches and Estoppel
Finally, appellants assert that Park City is barred from
claiming ownership of the property by laches and estoppel.
Those issues were not raised in the trial court and, therefore,
1. The court also concluded that the prescriptive easement
claim was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-5 (1987). However,
in Morris v. Blunt. 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916), the Utah
Supreme Court held that the predecessor section to the present
code does not apply to actions for prescriptive easements.
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we decline to reach them.
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

See James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799,

Affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judge
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QUIT-CLATK DJ5ED.

DAN McPOLIN

and

Bella

McPolin, h i s wife, Grantors, of.

the following described house ant' premises located in Park City,
Summit County, Utah,
All the r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t of the said Grantors of,
in and t o that c e r t a i n one-story, frame, three roomed dwelling
house s i t u a t e d on the e a s t e r l y s i d e on S i l v e r creek and about
one hundred feet e a s t e r l y from the lumber yard of the Summit
Lumber Company.
y

Together with a l l the r i g h t s and priveleges of the said

Grantors in the land on which said house stands and frfrarH imme-

March, A. D. 1906.

jln A) %#/;i
-fi^/UL )lqsfo4U\
EXHIBIT 2

State of Utah,

)
(

County of Summit.

08.

)

On t h i s 19th day of March»:v!9o6, personally appeared before
me, Dan He?olin and Belle McPolin, his. wife, the signers of the
^O-rA&oAn&M^n^trument,. who duly acknowledged t o me that £hey

^M 1ft lift

NotaVy public.

EHTHY

no. 27044.

QUIT CLAIM DEED

SUMMIT COUHTY a municipal corporation, grantor, of the State of Ut..h, £<..*« sj
quit-claims to V/illiam Holph, grantee of Park City, Summit County, State of Utux.fwr n
Bum of Twenty-eight.& 68/100 Dollars, ($28.6d) , the following described property U ,
fcark City, Summit County, Utah, to-wit:
~:
&.1

Improvements East U. C. Traces, Park City, Utah.
JJ
This deed is made from title secured from a certain tax sale in the year tifat
and "by an axiditors deed to Summit County, dated May 1st, 1914 and inaccordanoe wilt
Section 26o5, compiled laws of Utah, 1907.
V/IT11ESS tne hand of said grantors, by its duly authorized clerk, this l-*.u u
of June, A.D. 1914.
SUMMIT C0U1JTY
(SEAL)
By Moses C. Taylor
STATE OP UTAH

)

Clerk.
f7y?

: ss.

'&

{ A

bXrabu o>

COUHTY OP SUI.1IIT )

On this 10th day of June, A. D. 1914, personally appeared before me, !3>8u4
C. Taylor, who being by me duly sv/orn, did say that he is the County Clerk of Suaii;
County, a municipal corporation of theState of Utah, that he executea the foregoing u
truaent in behalf of said Summit County and in accordance with a resolution of tae
Board &L County Commissioners passed on the 3rd day of June, A. D. 1914, and said
Moses c. Taylor, duly acKnowiedged to me That he executed ihe same.
(SEAL)

E. W. Farnsworth
County Recorder.
ooo

E1ITP.Y 110. 27710.

CUIT CLAIU DEED

SDl.fl.IIT COUIJTY, a municipal corporation, grantor of the state of Utah, £.•:•»;-«quit-olaims to V/illiam Rolfe, Grantee of Park City, Summit County, State of Ut-u, :.iCQ
the sum of One and no/100 (1.00) Dollars, the following described property situ^ut ;£jp
Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, to-wit:
^

IM
That certain frame dwelling house by Lumber Yard in Park City, Suimiit C;u^:^"
Utah, assessed to William Rolfe in the year 1912.
*""* *"
This deed is made under authority of section 2665 compiled laws of Uufc ;4».i
as amended by Chapters 114 & 116, Laws of Utah.lvll and in pursuance of an order *
of the Board of County Commissioners of said County made on the 5th day of June
A. D. 1917.
"
'
WIT1J3SS the hand of said grantor, by its duly authorised Clerk, this
21st dty of June, A. D. -1917.
SIT. HIT COUHTY
By
STATE OF UTAH

A. C. Hortin

. County Cler*.

)

: ss.
C0UI1TY OP SUIvlIIT )
On this iilst-day of June, A. D. 1917, A. C. Hortin, personally appeared
before me and being duly sworn, did say that he is the Cdmnty Clerk of Summit COUL;,
a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, and that he executed the fore£oir.:instrument in behalf of said County by* authority of a resolution of the Board of
County commissioners o | said County, passed on me 6th day of June, A. D. 1917, m
said A. C, Hortin acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Kate 7 . Ximball
County. iieoorder.

(SEAL)
ooo-

May 16, 1957

Mr Charles "olfe
Oakley, Utah

Dear Mr *k>lfef
I checked over the recdrds on the tax situation if youre
fathers place in Park ^ity, and Found that in 193S

a quit

claim deed was issued by the county to youre father for $33*00
l

he receipt and everything was made out to William Rolfe Sr.
So I h^ve no way of knowing who paid that money*
From 1940 until 1954 the'taxes were taken care bf by

widows abatement, by the county commissioners* In the year
1955 you paid the taxes of $3^06 and in 1956 you paid the taxes
in the amount of 7*33•
I hape this is the information that you want, but if I
can help you any more please let me know*
^incerly,
^

^

•

^

^

-

Summit County Treasurer,

XHIBIT 5

itry No. 97001
TAX DEED

(X
tSUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate and p o l i t i c of the s t a t e of Utah, Grantor, hereby
rr
anveys to Charles Rolfe Grantee, of Oakley, Utah the f o l l o w i n g described jreal e s t a t e i n 9
JMMIT COUNTY, UTAH:
3

u

House i n lumber yand

This conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the Grantee of the sum of $12.5
elinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs, constituting a charge against said real
state, which was sold to said County at preliminary sale for non-payment of general taxes
ssessed against it for the yean 1958 in the sum of $7.8l.
DATED this 13th day of June 1963.
SUMMIT COUNTY

SEAL) (Seal)
By

Reed D. Pace. County Auditor.

« « « « * -*

lecorded a t the request of County Clerk June 19 A.O. 1963 at 1:21 P.M.
Wanda Y. S p r l g g s , County Recorder
Revenue Stamps $3.85 (Cancelled

Entry No. 97003

Dr. Dan Oniki and K. Helen Oniki, his wife Grantors, of Salt Lake City, County of Sal
Lake,. State of Utah, hereby QUIT-CLAIMS to Pete Robert Toly and Mary Lou W. Toly, his wife
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common, Grantees of
Park City, Utah for the sum of Ton Dollars and other good and valuable consideration, the
ollowing described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah:
«

—^ o 4„ Block 28 of Snyders

COMMISSIONERS

i t t i o o. Pkct

CAALO* L r O « T I «
KOY O M O I
O. M f l V I N FLINOf * •

eovMtv cLi»i
• U N C H C * . YOUMO

Summit County
State of Utah

ALAM O . M A N O t I N
*TTO«*«r

ftOMALD ft. IIOtlNftON
IMI*I»

COALVILLE. UTAH
r ^..84017^-:~'.^P***'

wio o. ruAiim
:

**- ••A * « t * » 0

Aug. 3 1 , 1972

This is to advise you that your application for abatement
of taxes for 1972 has been approved by the County Commissioners
The abatement allowed will be shown on your Tax Notice*

cerely,

JT^ J

Reed D. Pace
Summit County Clerk*

v^^-f/ 1 r£

t u t * o f Structure-

_

_

_

_

-.

jaox

-

__

Phone*

/-J

-

^ g ? -.-Iff, ftvo^fr

a TQreerfZa^^^fc

Typa of Construction
DFrama.aBrick.Var.
D Brick O Block G Concrete a Steal
Max Oca Load
RraSprinkJarOYas Q No

Total
Required

Speoai Aporovai*

r

Received

24

NotReaJ

Board of Adjustment
Health Dept.
Fire Dept.
d

r

e

e

e

'

»

—

| * State UcTnio: - |w~CltyrX
HrynCo.Llc.Na

Soil Report
Water or Wett Permit
Traffic Engineer
Flood Control

• SUiaUc.No*-- |*Crty/Cc*Uc.Na

Sewer o r Septic Tanlt
[City Engineer (off sner
Gasv

Common l-fc
feStataUcNo.

_^t

.<

• OtyfCcvLJaNav-

t *\*m

; ;---.x

„ J££s?
* State-Lie. No--

^aty/Ca-UcNOr

/f/iscrS'

-CLJL
75T

~

Land Use* Cert.
Electrical Dept;

fa of Land or Structure (Past 3 yrs4

HiBack C G . €r S.
Other
* Aeeeteory Btdgs. Now on Lot

xvon lot

Bond Required

•

No

Amount

This appHcat^cndees !«• become a pe«TnJt untM s*sn*d be*ow.

emem/KjncLaf ConstO

Build

.Q-Remodel

D

Move* .

Qc©nvert.U*e

perking spaces:
Covered

HECK

Q Yes

Q

Addition

J*

Demokah

Uncovered
Zone-Appn

Zone.

4-*-t
vS

I 1

U

^PtotPian

C

J

> " ~

Signature of
Approval
^ _
This parmit becomes nuiTand void if work or construction authorized is not comj
rnenced within 180 days, or if construction or work is suspended or abandoned for*!
period of 180 days at any time after work is commenced. I hereby certify that I haver
read and examined this application and know the same to ba true and correctAJI ^ * L
visions of iawa and ordinances governing thia typa of work will ba compiled wrtrrlj
whether specified herein or not the- granting of a parmit does not presume to g**y
authority to violate or cancel the provisions of any other state or locaJ law regjOatto
construction or the performance of construction and that I make this statarnam
under penalty of perjury,

Signature of Contractor or Authorised Agent
House or
Houee CrGereee
if
Attache*
*

it
Signature
of Owner (tf owner!
jgn»
fcP 3

Indicate*

Census Tract.

Traffic Zone

lOete)
{Coordinate Idenu No.

Wft'h

f)iJf>'So *\

A

Yes.

Q

Or what i s l e f t of i t ,

A

Uh-huh

Q

Merl, do you have in your exoeripn^ •
J - experience in your

i

guess?

(yes).

life, I take it you have been involved with building with
your husband.

You have any idea how much things cost,

general idea?
A

Quite a bit.

We have done

C

Tell me what kind of building you have done?

A

We built our house.

Q

When you say "we" what do you mean?

A

My husband and I.

Q

After that?

A

We have remodeled a number of homes.

a

lot of building.

We have

some rentals and we remodel them and work on then and
replace things on them.
Q

Do you have an opinion as to what it would cost

to replace this structure?
A

I am sure we couldn't replace it for 20,000.

0

It would be more than 20,000?

A

It would be more than 20,000.

Q

Is there any way -

ooviously the building was

destroyed and you didn't know about it wl-^n < f
u
"Jlen it was cestrcyec,
did you?
A

no.
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J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586
Park City Municipal Corporation
445 Marsac Avenue
P.O. Box 1480
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (801)649-9321
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VELMA MARCHANT, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.

i
]

JUDGMENT

PARK CITY, a municipal
corporation, JACK
COPPEDGE, and the STATE
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

i
Civil No. 7174
]
]1 Honorable Leonard H. Russon
]
;
]

This matter came regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding,
the Trial concluded on May 7, 1987, after all parties had
fully presented all evidence and argued their respective
positions.

The

parties

appeared

through,

and

were

represented by, their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith,
Esq., Assistant City Attorney, and James W. Carter, Esq.,
City

Attorney,

for

Defendant

Park

City

Municipal

Corporation, Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General

for Defendant State of Utah, and Robert Felton, Esq., for
Plaintiffs, Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod,
Mona Liechty and Merle R. Anderson.

Evidence was received in the form of testimony, exhibit
and stipulation, oral argument on the facts and law were
made

by

respective

counsel

and

legal

memoranda

were

submitted.

Having
admitted,
argument

given

full

the

legal

made,

the

consideration

memoranda
Court

to

submitted,

having

entered

the
and
a

evidence
the

oral

Memorandum

Decision and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law does hereby Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows:

1.

Plaintiffs Complaint, and each cause thereof, is

dismissed with prejudice.

2.

Fee ownership of the real property in.question,

which is particularly described as:
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16,
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian thence North 36°40f9" West 71.46 feet; thence
North 57°29f15" East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58,45u
East 70.93 feet; thence South 55°6f25" West 55.77 feet
to the point of beginning.

-2-

is quieted in the State of Utah free of any interest, lien,
easement, or encumbrance of Plaintiffs.

3.

Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees and

costs of court,

4.

This is a final and appealable judgment.

DATED this _£

day of 4**rreT 1987.

BY THE COURT

i riven
Leonard H. Russon
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

j Crai^Smi^Wj^ Esq.
ttornafypor
Defendant
&
Park City Municipal Corporation

Atan Bachman, Esq.
Attorney, for Defendant,
Stat^ oi
""

Felton,. Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586
Park City Municipal Corporation
445 Marsac Avenue
P.O. Box 1480
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (801)649-9321
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VELMA MARCHANT, et al.
Plaintiffs,

i
]

v.

i
])

PARK CITY, a municipal
corporation, JACK
COPPEDGE, and the STATE
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

i
Civil No. 7174
i
)i Honorable Leonard H. Russon
]
I
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This matter came on regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District
Judge presiding.

The parties appeared through and were

represented by their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith,
Esq., Assistant City Attorney and James W. Carter, Esq.,
City Attorney for Defendant Park City Municipal Corporation,
Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for Defendant
State of Utah and Robert Felton, Esq., for the Plaintiffs,

practice for Silver King Coalition Mines Company to allow
miners to construct houses on real property

the Company

owned.
4.

Plaintiffs' predecessors

in interest worked for

Silver King Coalition Mines Company and were permitted to
construct a house on the real property in question.
5.

The

underlying

real

property

in

question

was

assessed by Summit County separately from the house located
thereon claimed by Plaintiffs.
6.

Defendant's predecessors in interest paid all real

property taxes assessed against the underlying real property
in question.
7.

Neither

Plaintiffs

nor

their

predecessors

in

interest paid any taxes on the underlying real property in
question.
8.

Plaintiffs did not have possession of the real

property in question for a period in excess of seven years
prior to filing their complaint; it was abandoned, empty and
open and in a state of deterioration and was rarely visited
by Plaintiffs.
9.

The chain of title through which Plaintiffs claim

title to the real property in question is discontinuous.
10.
were

The tax deeds through which Plaintiffs claim title

given

by

Summit

County

pursuant

to

unpaid

tax

delinquencies on the improvements located on the underlying
real property in question.
-3-

11.

The house which had been owned by Plaintiffs1

predecessors was removed or demolished by a third party, not
a party to this action.
12.

Because of the abandoned and deteriorated nature

of the house on the property Park City granted a demolition
permit

for

the

demolition

of

the

house,

on

proper

application, to a third party claiming ownership of the
house.
13.

There was no evidence presented as to the value of

the house and no finding as to the value can be made without
gross speculation.
14.

Plaintiffs were aware of the destruction of the

house prior to September 7, 1981.
15.

No

notice

of

claim

was

ever

filed

by

the

Plaintiffs against Defendant State of Utah.
16.

Notice of claim was filed against Defendant Park

City on September 20, 1982, more than one year after the
Plaintiffs learned of the destruction of the house.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The chain of title through which the Defendant

State of Utah claims title is superior to the chain of title
through which Plaintiffs claim title.
2.
underlying

Plaintiffs'
real

claim

property

insufficient descriptions

to
in

title

by

question,

deed
fails

to

the

due

to

in the claimed deeds and a lack

of

continuity

of

Plaintiffs1

claimed

chain

of

title.

Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improvements
located upon the real property in question.
3.

The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title

to the real property conveyed improvements only and had no
effect on title to the underlying real property in question.
A.

The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title

to the underlying real property in question add nothing to
the title of the Plaintiffs'.
5.

Adverse possession cannot be had against Defendant

Park City, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, or
against

Defendant

State

of

Utah

pursuant

to Utah

Code

Annotated § 78-12-13, 1953 as amended.
6.

Plaintiffs' claim of title to the real property in

question by adverse possession and claim of easement by
prescription

are

barred

by

the

applicable

statute

of

limitations pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5, 1953
as amended.
7.
barred

Plaintiffs' claim against the State of Utah is
by

Plaintiffs'

failure

to

comply

with

the

Utah

Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1,
et. seq.
8.

Plaintiffs'

claims

against

Defendant

Park City

Municipal Corporation are barred by Plaintiffs' failure to
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Annotated § 63-30-1, et. seq.
-5-

9.

Plaintiffs' claim of adverse possession of the

real property

in question

fails, pursuant

to Utah Code

Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953 as amended, for failing to show
payment of all taxes which have been levied and assessed
upon the real property in question according to law.
10.

Plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession of the

real property in question and of prescriptive easement fail
since possession by Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest was
not adverse to the interests of Defendants' predecessors in
interest.
11.
entire

Plaintiffs' claim of prescriptive easement to the
area

of

the real property

in question

fails as

inapplicable to the facts of the case and concerns only use
rather than possession of or title to real property.
12.
for

Defendant Park City is not liable to Plaintiffs

issuing

application,
wrongfully

a

demolition

notwithstanding
obtained

or

the

permit,

based

whether

on

the

demolition

proper

permit

work

was

unlawfully

performed.
13.

Plaintiffs have stated no claim against the State

of Utah for the destruction of the house.
14.

Plaintiffs'

complaint,

and each cause

thereof,

should be dismissed with prejudice and title to the real
property in question should be quieted in the State of Utah
free

and

clear

of

any

interest,

encumbrance by Plaintiffs.
-6-

lien,

easement,

or

15.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages against

Defendants.

Wherefore,
Defendants

let judgment

and against

be entered

the Plaintiffs

in favor

in accordance

these findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Dated this

<£*#L day of June, 1987

By the Court

5//Jane r
Leonard H. Russon
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

"Crjjrig smith,
o i t h , Esq,
Esq.
t t o r n e y for Defendant
Park City Municipal Corporation

Alan Bachman,
bacliman, Esq,
Esq.
Attorrj£yyfor Pefendant^
Stati

>ert Felton, ^
Attorney for Plaintiffs
M53
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STATUTES
1.

§ 78-12-5.2 U.C.A. (1953) - LIMITATION OF ACTIONS RE TAX
TITLES

2.

§ 78-12-5.3 U.C.A. (1953) - DEFINITION OF "TAX TITLE"

3.

§ 2655 COMPILED LAWS OF UTAH (1907) AND AMENDMENTS

4.

§ 80-3-1 U.C.A. (1943)

5.

UTAH MARKETABLE TITLE ACTION §§ 57-9-2 and 57-9-3
U.C.A. (1953)

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
not Applicable in a quiet title action by the
other cotenants against the purchasing cotenant who attempted to exclude the other cotenants after the purchase. Maasey v. Pro the ro,
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1983).
—Former record titleholders.
Where former record titleholders were obligated to pay the 1964 taxes on the real property but failed to do so and conveyed away all
their interest and title in the property prior to
the final or auditor's tax sale, and at such tax
sale the former titleholders appeared and paid
the delinquent taxes and purchased an auditor's tax deed, the former titleholders, by meeting their tax obligation at the tax sale, could
not acquire any title or interest in the property
beyond that which they already had, which

78-12-5.2

was no interest or title since they had conveyed
away their interest and title prior to the tax
sale; therefore, the former titleholders could
not and did not purchase a tax title at the tax
sale and were not entitled to the protection of
the tax title statutes, §§ 78-12-5.1 to 78-12-5.3.
Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 1982).
Validity of section.
This statute is a valid statute of limitations
designed to validate tax titles. Although Laws
1951, ch. 58 repealed parent statute of Laws
1951, ch. 19, it did not repeal ch. 19. Under
such circumstances it is not reasonable to assume that the legislature intended to repeal
Laws 1951, ch. 19. Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d
310,283 P.2d 884 (1955) (see Compiler's Notes,
above).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles:
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National
Mortgage Bond Corp. — A Need for Remedial
Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions 5 84 et seq.
C.J.S. — 53 CJ.S. Limitations of Actions
* 42.
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «»
19(7).

78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title — Limitations of action or
defense — Proviso.
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from
the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or
directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and
after the expiration of one year from the date of this act. Provided, however,
that this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal
title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or
been in actual possession of such property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action or defense. And provided further,
that this section shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an action by
the holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds a lien against
such property which is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax
title.
History: C. 1943,104-2-5.10, enacted by L.
1961, eh. 19, 5 2.
"Date of this act". — The term "date of this
act," referred to in the first section, means the
effective date of Laws 1951, Chapter 19, i.e.,
May 8, 1951.

Cross-Reference*. — Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 5 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, § 59-10-29 et seq.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Superiority of tax title.
—Quitclaim deed.
Quitclaim deed given to utility company's
grantor which failed to show that the maker
had any title to the land the deed purported to
convey other than recital that such maker was
the heir at law of the original owner did not
convey title to the utility company's grantor
and the utility company did not have any
standing to challenge the title held by later
purchaser of tax deed State Rd Comm'n v
Thompson, 17 Utah 2d 412, 413 P 2d 603
(1966)

78-12-5 3

Tolling of statute.
—Previous quiet title action.
Section 78-12-40 permitted defendants attacking a tax title in a quiet title action to
prove tolling of the statute of limitations
where, within one year previous, an action in
which a similar claim had been asserted by
plaintiffs was dismissed not on the merits
Thomas v BrafTet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305
P2d 507 (1956)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brighara Young Law Review. — Utah's
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles
The Continuing Specter of Lyman v National
Mortgage Bond Corp — A Need for Remedial
Legislation, 1976 B Y U L Rev 457

Am. J u r . 2d. — 72 Am Jur 2d State and
Local Taxation § 1031 et seq
C.J.S. — 53 C J S Limitations of Actions
§ 42, 85 C J S Taxation § 966 et seq
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=»
19(7), Taxation •» 803

78-12-5.3. Definitions of "tax title" and "action."
(1) The term "tax title" as used in § 78-12-5.2 and § 59-2-1364, and the
related amended §§ 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the course of a
statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property
whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien.
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and
cross-complaints and all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is sought.
History: C. 1943,104-2-5.11, enacted by L.
1951, ch. 19, ft 3; 1987, ch. 4, ft 305.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, added the
subsection designations and made a statutory
reference change

Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch 4, ft 307 provides that this section has retrespective operation to January 1, 1987
Cross-References. — Tax sales, ft 59-10-29
e t seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Invalid tax tide
"Tax title*
—Failure to attach affidavit.
Invalid tax title.
Tax title holders may avail themselves of the
special statute of limitations provided for tax
titles regardless of either the invalidity of their
tax title or their inability to establish an affirmative claim to title apart from their tax title
Fredenksen v. LaFleur, 632 P 2d 827 (Utah
1981)

T a x title".
—Failure to attach affidavit
Failure of county auditor to attach his affidavit to county assessment roll did not void auditor's tax deed to county since term "tax title,"
as defined by this section, would indicate that
Legislature intended to include within statutes
of limitation tax titles which were initiated by
tax sales the records of which would not show
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Chap. 49.

CHAPTER 49.
SALE OF REAL BSTATE FOR TAXES
A n Act to amend Section 2655, Revised Statutes of U t a h , 1898, as amended by Chapter
76, Laws of U t a h , 1905, relating to the sale of real estate for taxes and the distribution of the proceeds.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
SECTION 1. Section Amended. That Section 2655. [Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898], as amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah, 1905, be
and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:

2655. Real Estate Deed to County to be Sold at Auction. Whenever a county has received a tax deed for any real estate sold for delinquent taxes, the Board of County Commissioners, shall, during the
month of May in each year, after giving the statutory notice, offer for
sale at the front door of the County Court House, at the time specified
in the notice, all such real property not heretofore sold or redeemed;
provided, that in cases where the description of such real estate is so
defective as to convey no title, such real estate shall not be so offered.
The Count}" Clerk is authorized to execute deeds therefor in the name of
the county and attested by his seal, vesting in the purchaser all of the
title of the State, of the County, and of each city, town, school, or other
taxing districts interested, in the real estate so sold. The money arising from such sale must be paid into the County Treasury, and the
Treasurer must settle for the same as in the case of money received for
redemption, as provided in the next preceding section. The Board of
County Commissioners may at any time after the period of redemption
has expired and before the property has been deeded to the county or
sold as hercn provided, permit a redemption from any sale where the
property has been sold to the county, but in no case for a less sum than
the tax, interest and costs. All property for which there is no purchaser
at the sale provided for in this section, shall thereafter be disposed of
on the day of the first regular meeting of the Board of County Commissioners in any month, at either public or private sale as the said board
may determine, and the money received therefor shall be apportioned
as in the manner of tax sales redemptions.
Approved this 14th day of March, 1907..
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empowered to do any and all things necessary to make a full and complete investigation of the matters and things hereinabove enumerated
and to that end to employ the necessary clerical assistance, and to provide the necessary office room, stationery, printing, blank forms and
other incidental matters required to carry into effect the provisions
of this Act
Sec. 6. Appropriation. There is hereby appropriated out of the
General Fund not otherwise appropriated, the sum of Six Thousand
Dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary for the purposes of
this Act.
Sec. 7. Repeal. That Sections 2427x, 2427x1 and 2427x3, Compiled
Laws of Utah, 1907, are hereby repealed.
Sec. 8. * This act shall take effect upon approval.
Approved March 20th, 1911.

CHAPTER 114.
COLLECTION OF TAXES.
An Act to amend Sections 2621, 2642, 2644, 2653, 2654 and 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah,
1907, relating to the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, tax-sale records
and duplicates thereof to be furnished to the State Auditor; providing that taxes
erroneously assessed or collected may be refunded or allowed by the Board
of Count/ Commissioners; requiring the reassessment of property not sold
because of irregularity of assessment; authorizing County Commissioners to
accept a sum less than taxes, interest and cost in certain tax sales; providing
for the distribution of the proceeds from tax sale redemptions; and providing
for the sale of real estate held by the county under tax deed and for settlement
therefor.

Be it enacted by tlie Legislature of the State of Utah:
. SECTION 1. Sections Amended. That Section 2621, 2G42, 2644, 2653,
2654 and 2655, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, be and tbe same are
hereby amended to read as follows:
2621. Sale for Delinquency. Eecord. On the third Monday of December of each year, the treasurer shall expose for sale between the hours
of ten a. m. and three p. m. sufficient of such delinquent real estate to
pay the taxes and costs, at public auction, at the front door of the county
court house, and sell the same to the highest responsible bidder for cash,
and the treasurer shall continue to sell from day to day between srach
hours until the property of such delinquent is exhausted or the taxes
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and costs are paid. The treasurer shall make a record of all sales of
real property in a book to be kept by him for that purpose, therein
describing the several parcels of real property on which the taxes and
costs were paid by the purchasers, in the same order as the published
list of delinquent sales contained in the list of advertisements on file
in his office, stating in separate columns the amount as obtained from
the tax list of each kind of tax and costs for each tract or lot, how much
and what part of each tract or lot was sold, to .whom sold and the date
of sale. A separate column shall also be provided Wsaid record, in which
the treasurer shall enter the date of redemption. When all the sales
shall have been made, the treasurer shall file the record in his office;
provided, that in all counties there shall be adopted a uniform system
of tax sale record, which shall be recommended by the state auditor,
and that a duplicate of said record of each county shall be furnished
by the county treasurer to the state auditor, in loose leaf or bound form
as may be directed by the state auditor, and to which shall be added the subsequent taxes of each succeeding year, together with the redemptions as reported to the state auditor by the treasurers of the various
counties, upon blanks to be prescribed by the state auditor.
2642. Erroneous and Illegal Taxes Refunded. Any taxes, interest and
costs paid more than once or erroneously or illegally collected, may by
order of the board of county commissioners be refunded by the county
treasurer, and the portion of such taxes, interest and cost of the state,
cities and school districts, must be refunded to the county, and the
proper officer must draw his warrant therefor in favor of the county:
provided that the board of county commissioners u#on sufficient evidence being produced that property has been erroneously or illegally
assessed, may order the county treasurer to allow the taxes on that
part of property erroneously or illegally assessed, to be deducted before payment of the said taxes.
2644. Sale Omitted for Irregularity. If the treasurer discovers before
the sale that on account of any irregular assessment or of any other
error any land ought not to be sold, he must not offer that land for.
sale; and the board of county commissioners must cause the assessor
to enter the uncollected taxes upon the assessment book of the next
succeeding year, on the basis of the valuation and rates of the year
for which it was erroneously assessed, to be collected as other taxes,
are collected thereon.,
2653. Redemption. In case property is sold to the county as purchaser pursuant to section 2623 and is subsequently assessed.
pursiiant to section 2651, no person must be permitted to redeem
from such sale except upon payment also of the amount of such subse-quent assessment, interest and costs, unless in the judgment of the
county commissioners the interests of the State and the county will be
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subserved by accepting a less sum than the amount due for taxes,
interests and costs.
2654. Distribution of Money Received for Redemption. Whenever property sold to the county pursuant to the provisions of this title is redeemed or the certificate of sale is assigned as herein provided, the
moneys received on account of such redemption or assignment must be
distributed as follows: The original and subsequent taxes, and forty
per cent, of interest and costs of sale and cost of advertising received
must be apportioned to the state, county, city, town, school district,
and other taxing districts interested, in the proportion of their respective taxes, and the balance must be paid to the county; provided that in
all cases where a sum less than the taxes, interest and costs is accepted
in settlement, the proceeds of such settlement shall be applied, first to
the payment of the original and subsequent taxes, and the remainder;
if any there be, to the payment of interest and costs. The county treasurer must keep an accurate account of all moneys paid in redemptions
of property sold to the county and for assignments of certificates of
sale thereof, and must, on the first Monday of March in each year, or
at such other time as the state auditor'may direct make a detailed
report, verified by his affidavit of each account, year for year, to the
state auditor, in such form as the state auditor may desire. Whenever
the county receives from the county auditor any grant of property so
sold for taxes, the same shall be recorded, at the requeft of the county
auditor, free of charge by the county recorder, and shall be immediately
reported by the county auditor to the board of county commissioners.
2655. Real Estate Deed to County to be Sold at Auction. Whenever a
county has received a tax deed for any real estate sold for delinquent
taxes, the board of county commissioners shall during the month of
May in each year, after giving the statutory notice, offer for sale at
the front door of the county court house, at the time specified in the
notice, all such real property not heretofore sold or redeemed; provided,
that in cases where .the description of such real estate is so defective
as to convey no title, such real estate shall not be so offered. Tht>
county clerk is authorized to execute deeds therefor in the name of the
county and attested by his seal, vesting in the purchaser all of the title
of the State, of the county, and of each city, town, school or other taxing
district interested, in the real estate so sold. The money arising from
such sale must be pgid into the county treasury, and the treasurer must
settle for the same as in the case of money received for redemption, as
provided in the next preceding section. The board of county commis-"
sioners may, at any time after the period of redemption has expired and
before the sale as lj*rein provided, permit a redemption from any sale
where the property has been sold to the county. All property for which
there is no purchaser at the sale provided for in this section shall there-

80-3-1

Title 80—Revenue and Taxation

[634]
*

CHAPTER 3

f
.*
A*

DEFINITIONS

*•

80-3-1.

"Property," "Real Estate," "Improvements," "Personal Prop,
erty," "Value," Defined.
In this title, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:
(1) "Property" means property which is subject to assessment and
taxation according to its value, and does not include moneys, credits,
bonds, stocks, representative property, franchises, good will, copyrights,
patents, or other things commonly known as intangibles.
^
(2) "Real estate" includes
<J|
(a) The possession of, claim to, ownership of or right to the posses*
sion of, land.
.-A/
(b) All mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land/all
timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or being on
the lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges
appertaining thereto.
/dgf'
(c) Improvements.
tffc
(3) "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures,
fences and improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether
the title has been acquired to the land or not.
- jp
(4) "Personal property" includes
?$!•
(a) Every class of property as defined in subsection (1) hereof
which is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning
of the terms "real estate" and "improvements."
i*1(b) Gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets or alleys.*
(c) Bridges and ferries.
$>
(5) "Value" and "full cash value" mean the amount at which the
property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent
debtor.
(L. 31, p. 123, §§ 5865, 5893, 5894.)

History.
This section was R. S. 1898, §2505;
Comp Laws 1907, §2505.

not amount to double taxation. StilliB**
v. Lynch, 56 U. 540, 192 P. 272, 12 A. **
R. 552.
'S

Cross-references.
Constitutional provision, Const. Art.
XIII, § 2 ; railroad rolling stock, etc., as
personalty, Const. Art. XII, § 14.
,
^ ^ A A.
1. Double taxation.
This section as it formerly read, and
Art. XIII, § 2 of the Constitution of this
state prior to its amendment in 1930,
forbade
double
taxation.
McCornick
&
forbade
double 49
taxation.
McCornick
&
Co. v. Bassett,
U. 444, 164
P. 852, applying Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 2505-2509.
But "double taxation means taxing the
same property twice."
Stillman v.
Lynch, 56 U. 540, 551, 192 P. 272, 12 A.
L. R. 552.
When property of corporation has been
taxed, its stock is nontaxable. Stillman
v. Lynch, 56 U. 540, 192 P. 272, 12 A. L.
R. 552.
The taxation of title retaining notes
and conditional sales agreements does

2. "Property."
* ^
The term "property," as defined BJ
Comp. Laws 1907, §2505, included W*
only money, but credits, etc. Ij» ?
Thourot's Estate, 52 U. 106, 110, 17*r%
597
* J;
*
£
3. "Real estate."
. . '" g
DU t 1
An engine and boiler
^ -. 2[ W
brick
foundation, and
firmly affixeu
brick
foundation,
and
firmly
I
bolts leaded down and used m undtr*
unjrj
ground workings of a mine, are ^ E g ,
in term "real estate." MammotP j ^ Co. v. Juab County, 10 U. 232, 37 r»
«^t
4. "Value."
! ^
Under subdivision (5) tne
of aS
tnw *ifab
the market value, and not , ?fjLu
ffcf
should have been taken as the r *rjjjil
assessment of bank shares.
^^gM^
Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. ^ • ^ J
54 U. 49, 63, 179 P. 67.

MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE
*

t f i ^ r v . C. 1953, 57-8-36, enacted by L.
iJSTch:^§19u. A #
' tondominium Ownership Act. — See
i*«fffl-l and notes
thereto.
amendments".
— The term
1 Meaning
mLmin* of referred
"amendmei
- i^adnients,"
to throughout this sec-

57-9-1

tion, means those amendments made by L.
1975, ch. 173, §§ 1 through 19, which now appear as §§ 57-8-3, 57-8-6, 57-8-7, 57-8-10,
57-8-13 through 57-8-14, 57-8-16.5, 57-8-18,
57-8-24, 57-8-27, 57-8-32.5, 57-8-35, 57-8-36

CHAPTER 9
MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE
Auction
>» 57-9-1. Wk*1 constitutes marketable record
f5fl
title.
' *
'
*
.67-9-2. Rights and interests to which marketable record title is subject
' 67-9-3. Marketable record title held free and
clear of interests, claims and
charges.
Filing of notice of claim of interest au"tf.9-4.
thorized — Effect of possession
of land by record owner of possessory interest.

IN'

Section
57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest —Contents
— Filing for record.
57-9-6. Applicability of provisions.
57-9-7. Existing statutes of limitations and
recording statutes not affected
57-9-8. Definitions.
57-9-9. Legislative purpose and construction.
57-9-10. Extension of limitation period.

What constitutes marketable record title.
j * Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an
|~^xuobroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for forty years or
rfaore, shall be deemed to have a marketable record title to such interest as
defined in § 57-9-8, subject only to the matters stated in § 57-9-2. A person
be deemed to have such an unbroken chain of title when the official
public records disclose a conveyance or other title transaction, of record not
\ than forty years at the time the marketability is to be determined, which
id conveyance or other title transaction purports to create such interest,
dther in
» (1) the person claiming such interest or
u
(2) some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other
V title transactions of record, such purported interest has become vested in
the person claiming such interest: with nothing appearing of record, in
either case, purporting to divest such claimant of such purported interest.
[History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
fcuf

ANALYSIS

possession,
by acquiescence.
IpAdTene possession.
*; M®&* continuous possession and use of canal
^ia!a ^ ^ n ^ n e t y years and use of the land on
J$T*k i i d e 8 thereof in the maintenance of the

canal, established title in such land by adverse
possession; possession was hostile in that it
was of such a character that ownership could
be inferred therefrom; city acquired title de-
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spite non-payment of taxes due to the acquisition of title prior to the enactment of the statute requiring payment of taxes as a condition
of obtaining the title to land. State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Cox Corp., 29 Utah 2d 127,506 P.2d
54 (1973).

Boundary by acquiescence.
Marketable Record Title Act did not apply ^
defeat fundamental doctrine of boundary byny f
quiescence established in the defendants In a
quiet title action. Olsen v. Park Daughters In* *
Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973) "
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Purchaser § 123 et seq.
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§§ 189-200.
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of "marvj
ketable record title" statutes, 31 A.LJUth lljf
Key Numbers. — Vendor and Purchaser i
130.

57-9-2. Rights and interests to which marketable recoil
title is subject.
The marketable record title shall be subject to:
(1) All interests and defects which are inherent in the muniment
which such chain of record title is formed; provided, however, that a
general reference in such muniments or any of them, to easements, tin
restrictions or other interests created prior to the root of title shall notj
sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification be made the__
of a recorded title transaction which creates such easement, use resfiarij^j
tion or other interest.
(2) All interests preserved by the filing of proper notice or by
sion by the same owner continuously for a period of forty years or more£]
accordance with § 57-9-4.
(3) The rights of any person arising from prescriptive use or a periocT&f1
adverse possession or user, which was in whole or in part subsequent to ^
the effective date of the root of title.
T •«? .
(4) Any interest arising out of a title transaction which has been re- L
corded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title from which ^ 3
unbroken chain of title of record is started; provided, however, that such j
recording shall not revive or give validity to any interest which has been ^
extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the operation .& ^
§ 57-9-3.
.*:-'*.
(5) The exceptions stated in § 57-9-6 as to rights of reversioners » ;
leases, as to apparent easements and interests in the nature of easements* ^
and as to interests of the United States.
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 2.
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ANALYSIS

adverse possession,
joundary by acquiescence.
adverse possession.
City's continuous possession and use of canal
•or over ninety years and use of the land on
>oth sides thereof in the maintenance of the
anal established title in such land by adverse
wssession; possession was hostile m that it
m of such character that ownership could be
nferred therefrom; city acquired title despite
inpayment of taxes due to the acquisition of
itle prior to the enactment of the statute re-

quiring payment of taxes as a condition of obtaming the-title to land. State ex rel. Road
Comm'n v. Cox Corp., 29 Utah 2d 127,506 P.2d
54 (1973).
acquiescence.
Bound
b
M a r k e t a b l e Record Title Act did not apply to
d e f e a t f u n d a m e n t a l d o c t r i n e 0 f boundary by acq u i e 8 c e n c e established in the defendants in a
q u i e t title action. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv.
Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973).

57-9-3. Marketable record title held free and clear of interests, claims and charges.
Subject to the provisions of § 57-9-2, the marketable record title shall be
tield by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the land free
ind clear of all interests, claims or charges, whatsoever, the existence of
ffhich depends upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred
prior to the effective date of the root of title. All such interests, claims or
charges, however denominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future,
whether such interests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui juris or
under a disability, whether such person is within or without the state,
whether such person is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental,
are hereby declared to be void.
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, * 3.

57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authorized —
£
Effect of possession of land by record owner of
*'
possessory interest.
* (1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective such interest by filing for record during the forty-year period immediately
following the effective date of the root of title of the person whose record title
tfould otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath,
Setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any
kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the running of the forty-year period,
fhe notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person
acting in behalf of any claimant who is
;*
(a) under a disability,
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or
(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is uncertain at the time of filing the notice of claim for record.
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in
Possession of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during
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